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THE PEOPLE SPEAK
NOTHER instance of conquest over stare decisis by enlightened thought is the adoption of the Amendment
to the Constitution, restoring to the Legislature the
power to fix the salaries of the Judges and the Governor and
his Secretary, which successfully concluded a purposeful and
worthwhile undertaking.
In 1924 the proposal failed by an overwhelming majority of more than 60,000 votes; in 1926 it lost by only 9,000
votes; it was adopted in 1928 by a majority in excess of 17,000
votes.
This final result was due to ceaseless and apparently well
calculated campaigns of education. The sponsors for the
Amendment correctly appraised the difficulties attendant upon
any effort to change fundamental law, and directed all activities accordingly. The steady progress made in the two
last campaigns illustrates 'the persistency of effort and emphasizes the significance of the final vote.
In 1883 the people themselves fixed the salaries of these
officials at standards which were fair and reasonable for that
day, and consistent with the population of the State and its
stage of development at that time. In these recent campaigns
of education, the people were brought to realize that changed
conditions and increased costs of living, together with the lessened purchasing power of the dollar, which attended the
passing of forty-five years, had resulted in an actual and material reduction in the salaries of those officials.
The adoption of the Amendment plainly expresses the
deliberate and maturely considered judgment of the people
and signifies nothing else than their mandate to the General
Assembly. Dicta believes, not only that the General Assembly
will regard that mandate, but that it will be sincerely pleased
to do so and will lay aside political bias in seeing to it that
the Judiciary of Colorado is placed upon the plane of com-
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pensation which the importance and character of its public
service so justly merits.
It would be altogether unfair to recognize the passage of
this Amendment and yet fail to recognize the faithful services
of those largely responsible for that result. To the tireless
and efficient work of George P. Steele, who controlled and
directed the work throughout the entire state, must be attributed in no small degree the accomplishment of the task.
No detail has been too small nor any duty too arduous for his
personal attention. In like measure credit is due his associates
and willing helpers who, both in official capacities and as individual workers, have given most unselfishly of their time
and efforts.
Nor can the able conduct of the work in Denver under
the control of the Chairman of our Association's Committee
on Judicial Salaries, Hamlet J. Barry, and his faithful band
of fiery orators be overlooked. Also the Bar Associations of
the State in general deserve great credit for their efficient work
and co-operation in the campaign: The efficiency of their
efforts is shown in many instances by complete reversals of
the adverse votes of two years ago.
In conclusion, Dicta lifts its editorial hat in a gesture of
appreciation to the Press of Denver, and in general throughout the State, for their sincere and friendly espousal of the
cause, without which the task would have been rendered doubly difficult.

INDUSTRIAL BANKING AND REFORMS
By Louis A. Hellerstein of the Denver Bar
HE subject of industrial banking and interest rates upon
loans has become of utmost importance in this day and
age of installment purchases and deferred payment
plans. Time payments have become an accepted part of our
financial systems. Money as well, being a commodity just as
an automobile, clothing, jewelry and the like, is being purchased and repaid on the installment plan, with interest.
It has been this Time Purchase Plan that has brought
with it a need for industrial banking and built up in our country large financial institutions which serve the working man
and furnish him with money which he repays on an installment system. Examples of these organizations are the Morris
Plan System, Trustee's System, Hood System and the Winsett
Plan of loans, all of which are chain organizations and operate
branch offices in various cities over the United States, with
many million dollars loaned. Another type of industrial financing that has grown up is the Credit Unions in Massachusetts and New York. In these organizations loans are
made only to members and they are mutual and cooperative
enterprises.
The usual method of making these loans is upon a plain
note, or a note with co-signers or upon a chattel mortgage,
assignment of wages, or collateral of a nature acceptable to
the lending company. The most important factor, however,
to the lender is the character and integrity of the borrower
and this is his principal security. The indebtedness is repayable in installments of certain proportionate amounts per
month. As, for example, a loan of $100.00 would probably
be repayable in 10 equal installments of $10.00 each per month.
A system of credit for the wage earner is as important
as credit for the business man. Governor Cox of Ohio has
said, "The legalized loan office is more of a necessity in an
industrial community than perhaps a bank; for it is the poor
man, when he needs money, who needs it most." It has been
estimated that only 10% of our adult population can obtain
loans and credit from our commercial banks. The remaining
90% do not have the assetsor collateral which banks would
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accept as security for loans. It is this great middle class of
wage earners of our American public, who are more or less
steadily employed, and in time of an emergency, such as sickness, death in the family, or unforeseen circumstances, seek the
aid of our industrial financing systems termed industrial banking. They are of necessity small loans, presumably under
$300.00, and by reason of their character do not compete with
commercial banks.
With our system of industrial banking, unfortunately,
there grew up unscrupulous money lenders who took advantage of the poverty and distress of the borrower and by high
and greatly excessive interest charges and harshness of treatment earned for themselves the name of "loan sharks". The
Supreme Court of our State took cognizance of this problem
and in an opinion in one of our cases, Mr. Justice Teller states
as follows, quoting: "It is a common knowledge that there
is a large business carried on in the loaning of small sums of
money at a high rate of interest secured by personal property.
It is equally well known that there are grave abuses in the
business and that borrowers are treated with great harshness."
Groups of workers in different communities waged antiloan shark campaigns to oust the loan shark, but these well
intentioned people knew nothing of the facts relating to the
business and had no background of knowledge to intelligently
cope with the problem.
The first real attempt to make a serious and exhaustive
study of the subject before attempting any legislative relief
was begun by the Russell Sage Foundation, a philanthropic
and social service research organization, in New York, in
1908. After three years of study, the Foundation organized
a Division of Remedial Loans. The object of the Division
was to procure intelligent and reasonable regulation of the
small loan business, and interest rates and to remedy the loanshark evil. The results of the research had shown that no
existing laws were satisfactory. The study as well disclosed
that a solution of the loan-shark problem was by such regulation and laws under state supervision, under which both borrower and lender could deal in a plain straightforward manner and upon terms fair to both parties. The Foundation
found that two extremes existed in interest rates. Many states
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had no law regulating interest on small loans and others had
such laws that it was impossible for a loan company to legitimately operate at a profit.
There seemingly, as well, existed two different theories
as to interest rates and charges on these small loans as outlined.
One group seemed to be of the opinion that interest rates for
these loans should prevail the same as in a commercial bank.
They based their theory on sentiment and no actual experience.
The result of legislation based on this theory has caused the
laws to be flouted and both borrower and lender to defy the
laws. The second theory that seemed to subsist was that the
determination of the rate of interest should be regulated by
competition. This theory is likewise disproved by analysis
when we consider that the lender and borrower are not on an
equal footing. Competition can regulate only when the borrower can refuse to take a loan when the rate is too onerous.
By reason of the urgent and imperative need of the money the
borrower is in no position to bargain, with the result that unless the interest rate is regulated and controlled an unreasonable and exorbitant rate will be charged.
I believe it will be conceded by all that the business of
making small loans to workingmen, termed industrial banking, has a definite place in our system and fills a much felt
need. Seemingly the means of ridding the communities of
the loan sharks was to find a suitable substitute. Three substitutes suggested themselves. First there were the charitable
institutions. These, however, were no factor in curbing the
excessive interest rates for the reason that the American workingman does not want to be treated as a pauper or an object
of charity or a beggar, and by reason of his pride refuses to
apply to these institutions. Next there is the cooperative system, such as the credit union. This type of organization has
been highly successful in foreign countries, such as Italy, but
has not progressed a great deal in the United States. This
plan, however, is worthy of some further consideration and
is commendable. Finally, we have the licensed and regulated
industrial lender, whose business is banking, with small loans
a specialty and working men as his clientele. This last theory
was adopted by the Division of Remedial Loans of the Russell
Sage Foundation, by the Bureau of Legal Reforms of New
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York, and by others who met in New York in 1916, as the
substitute for the loan shark; and accordingly they prepared
a bill in accordance with their findings and the results of
their analyses.
The bill which was drawn in accordance with their research was simple in form and theory, known as the "Uniform
Small Loan Law". It authorized any person, copartnership
or corporation to obtain a license from the state, and having
obtained such license, to make loans of $300.00 or less, and to
charge therefor not in excess of 3Y2% per month computed
on unpaid balances; it regulated strictly the conduct of the
business of the lender; it provided suitable punishment for
loans by unlicensed dealers and prohibited loans made in
excess of the legal rates. The most important portion of the
bill was the fixing of a rate of 3Y2% per month, which was
termed the sustaining rate. The bill in principle recognized
that the risk on these loans is relatively higher and that the
duration of the loans is longer than commercial bank loans,
being usually of 12 months duration; that operating expense
is high because the amount of each loan is small and must be
collected in monthly installments; that investigation of the
reliability of borrowers must be made with greater care than
in the case of bank loans; and that in addition the small loan
agencies have no deposits to lend out as commercial banks
and are limited to their cash capital upon which they must pay
dividends. All of these factors were considered in arriving
at a sustaining rate of interest. Experience has proven the
rate was not too high. Many large corporations operating
industrial banking institutions show net earnings of 6 to 12%.
A report by a large institution in Virginia engaged in this
business, having a working capital of over two million dollars, showed net earnings of 10.57%. The rate is not too
high considering the hazards involved. Practical experience
in states has proven the basis for this rate as practical. In
Alabama the rate was fixed at 2% per month and a high
license fee required. No licensed lender could do business
under such regulation and the result is that unlicensed lenders
do all the business and charge exorbitant rates of interest. In
Illinois before the 3 2% a month rate was adopted the legal
rate was 7% per annum and the result was that only violators
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of this rate did business. At the time the bill was pending in
the Illinois Legislature, Judge Kenesaw M. Landis wrote one
of the Senators as follows: "Of course this 3 % seems a tremendous rate of interest for money but we are dealing with
a very practical question. The loans are small in amount, in
view of which it is my judgment that a 32 % per month rate
is a just rate." The Chicago Tribune wrote on this subject and
said "Loaning on wages is a precarious occupation and high
rates of interest are necessary."
The Uniform Small Loan Law, as promulgated with
variations, in detail, is now in operation and on the statute
books of 24 states. The first state to adopt the bill was Massachusetts, followed by New Jersey and New York. The Massachusetts bill is worthy of mention by reason of a plan under
which a supervisor fixes the rates for various types of loans
not to exceed 3% plus a graduated scale of additional fees.
The Supervisor has the authority to fix the rate on real estate
loans, let us say, at perhaps 2% per month; on furniture loans
2 % and the like. This gives Massachusetts an elastic rate
of interest not to exceed the legal rate. However, as the rate
is only 3%, many complaints have been heard that the rate is
too low and should be increased to 3 %, the Uniform Small
Loan Rate. The latest states to fall in line with this legislation have been Missouri and Wisconsin, both of which adopted the Uniform Small Loan Law in its entirety at the convening of their respective legislatures in 1927. Wherever enacted, the sustaining rate and Uniform Small Loan Law has
bettered conditions to the borrower and been a great benefit
to him. It has placed a strict legal protection about him, the
violation of which may result in punishment to the lender
through our criminal courts as well as the loss of the money
loaned to the borrower, both principal and interest. More
than this, however, the Uniform Small Loan Law has driven
out the loan shark and substituted licensed lenders in a legitimate enterprise, who can make a profit on the sustaining rate,
and who do not evade the law or disobey it. It attracts large
capitalists who are willing to engage in a lawful enterprise.
It facilitates credit and thereby increases business activity and
circulation of money to the benefit of local merchants as well
as the borrower.
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The situation in Colorado is peculiar. In the spring of
1919, the Uniform Small Loan Law was introduced in the
legislature then convening. The bill was fostered by the Russell Sage Foundation of New York, many philanthropic organizations, prominent citizens and social workers in the state.
It was urged that the bill be enacted. Unfortunately the bill
was amended to 1% per month instead of the sustaining rate
of 3y2% per month as the bill was introduced. The 1% per
month bill is still in effect in this state and has been in effect
since its enactment. The rate being so low it is inadequate to
attract capital as no company can operate at a profit under that
rate. The result is the same in Colorado as in other states.
The business of making these loans is in many cases in the
hands of the lenders who charge higher rates for the greater
risks by reason of violating the existing law. The Industrial
Bank Act of Colorado passed in 1923 has somewhat alleviated
the situation. This Act provides for the organization of corporations using the word "Bank" as part of their name which
may charge a rate of 10% per annum in advance on loans under $500.00, and also permits the acceptance of deposits and
savings which may be reloaned. The act as well provides for
supervision and examination by the State Bank Commissioner,
the same as in the case of commercial banks, and the Industrial
Banks must have a capital of a certain amount depending on
the population; in Denver, $75,000.00.
The 1919 Act (See C. L. 1921, Secs. 3781-3801) is unsatisfactory, and it is submitted that the adoption of a sustaining rate of 32% would establish a reasonable interest rate
that would drive out from our midst unlicensed lenders of
an obnoxious type who are the oppression of the working man
and a bane to the licensed lenders.
In conclusion, may I summarize by stating that Industrial Banking is an important need and a beneficial factor in
every community; that where there is no adequate legislation
and regulation of interest rates, the loan sharks thrive; that
the Uniform Small Loan Law is sound in theory, its sustaining rate of 3y % interest a month economically correct, and
proven so by experience; that twenty-four states have adopted
it; and that, in view of these facts, Colorado should at its next
legislature enact that law in its entirety.

THE NOVEMBER MEETING
AND DEBATE
N Monday, November 5, the Denver Bar Association
held its customary monthly meeting, which was the occasion of a lively debate between John E. Gross, Secretary of the Colorado Federation of Labor, and Frank C. West,
Attorney for the Employers' Mutual Company, upon the
merits and demerits of the Amendment to the Workmen's
Compensation Law, proposed by the Federation.
Several members who were unable to attend the meeting
having expressed their regret that they had not heard this
subject discussed, the editors of Dicta, deeming the subject of
sufficient interest, publish the following synopsis of the suggested Amendment, and of the arguments of the debaters:
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

To increase the maximum limit of compensation from the
present sum of $12. a week to $16. a week; and to raise the
percentage of compensation in proportion to wages from fifty
per cent. to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent.
To increase the amount of the employers' liability for
medical attention and to-increase the duration of its use.
To compute the average wage, where no exact amount is
specified by contract, upon the basis of the average daily wage
of all employees engaged in the same work at that place and at
the time of the accident, rather than upon the average daily
wage of the party injured, as computed from his wages for the
previous six months. Other specific means of computing
wages are set forth in the proposed Amendment.
These appear to be the clauses of the Amendment to
which the debaters addressed themselves.
MR. GROSS' ARGUMENTS

Uniformity of legislation was recommended in 1913 by
the Colorado Commission. Eleven states pay fifty per cent. of
wages, two pay fifty-five per cent., eight pay sixty per cent.,
and twenty states sixty-five or sixty-six and two-thirds per
cent. Only three states, including Colorado, pay a maximum
as low as $12. a week; thirty-six states pay a maximum of
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from $15 to $25 a deek. No other state computes the average
wage as Colorado does. Colorado pays the lowest maximum
and minimum weekly wage of any state.
Two hundred Colorado cases give the following average
compensations: forty-seven per cent. at $12. a week; six per
cent. at $5. (the minimum rate) a week; twenty-seven per cent.
at $9.15 a week; nineteen per cent. in dispute. The average
weekly wage was $24.89 a week. Less than half of the injured
employes received maximum compensation in 1926.
I believe a majority of cases arising from accidents in the
coal mines of Colorado do not begin their initial payments
within the time fixed by law, and a majority of the present
Industrial Commission frankly admit that the present method
of computing average wage tends to delay in paying compensation and to increase the number of hearings and the cost of
administration. The coal mining industry, representing less
than ten per cent. of the injury cases in this state is the principal contender for the present method of ascertaining the
average wage.
No statistics are available showing the percentage of cases
requiring more than the statutory allowance for medical and
hospital care. Of 19,797 accidents in 1926, twenty-five were
permanently and totally disabled and one hundred and sixtythree permanently partially disabled. Excess care would
probably be required in all of these instances, and investigation shows that the present allowance for medical care is insufficient in many cases to provide a proper period for recovery. The result is that the expense is transferred to the community by taxation, instead of being placed upon the industry,
which should bear the expense. Those industries which do
seek to prevent accidents should escape the burden of those
which do not.
The wages of women in this state are so low that a fifty
per cent. maximum compensation cannot possibly provide for
their necessities. The average weekly wage in compensable
cases in Colorado is less than $24 a week.
I am not able to answer the arguments employed by opponents of the Amendment regarding the ability of the industries to pay an increased compensation, for the reason that the

DICTA

employers have not been willing to discuss the situation with
organized labor. On this account, the Federation has had to
draw up the proposed amendment out of its own experience.
The bill is not an arbitrary choice but is open to suggestion
to reach and remove the evils of inequality under the present
Act.
MR. WEST'S ARGUMENTS

The Act was designed:
1. To give the workman definite and prompt relief, free
from the defense of contributory negligence, and remove him
as a source of income to litigious lawyers.
2. To remove the danger to the employer of excessive
verdicts.
3. To relieve the public of expensive medical and charitable care and of resentment between the parties.
In fifty per cent. of the cases prior to the passage of the
Act, the employer was found to be negligent, but in one-half
of these instances the employee's negligence was a contributing cause. Therefore, a maximum compensation of fifty per
cent. of the employee's wage was considered the proper limit
of relief under the Act, which creates liability without fault.
This is the rate adopted in nineteen out of forty-seven jurisdictions.
The Act has caused increased expense to the employer,
comparing its results with the former verdicts in negligence
cases and in one instance in Colorado this increase has amounted to one hundred sixty per cent. The proposed Amendment
would increase compensation in this instance forty-six per
cent., and the cost to the employer two hundred seventy-eight
per cent.
The premium for insuring coal companies would be increased thirty to forty per cent. under the Amendment, and
these companies have too small a margin of profit to absorb
this increase. In the case of logging companies the payrolls
would be increased at least seven per cent by the Amendment.
Although compensation is paid in a number of states at a
higher rate than the fifty per cent. maximum in Colorado, this
is offset by the fact that Colorado, unlike the other states, has
no maximum total amount recoverable in permanent disability
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cases. In Colorado the permanently injured man is paid during his lifetime. Thus, in Colorado a man of thirty years may
receive $22,000 during his lifetime, whereas the average total
amount he would receive in other states (a range of $3000. to
$10,000 maximum total) would be $5,350.
The chief injustice of the proposed Amendment lies in
the fact that the compensation provided for is not based upon
the actual earnings of the employee at all but upon something
else which the Amendment provides shall be taken as his earnings.
The present Act provides as follows:
"Section 47. The average weekly wage of the
injured employe shall be taken as the basis upon
which to compute benefits and shall be determined
as follows:
"(b) The total amount earned by the injured or
killed employe in the six months preceding the accident-divided by twenty-six-shall be considered as
the average weekly wage."
This is not a perfect provision, but its principle of compensating an employee according to the real value of his time
-his actual earning capacity-is sound. The defect is that,
as in coal mining, one six months varies greatly from another,
according to the season. A year's wage should be the basis of
computation, as it was in the Act before 1919.
The proposed Amendment ignores the injured employee's
true earning power and substitutes a highly artificial method
of computation. An example of this artificiality is demonstrated in Section 5, which in its relevant parts is as follows:
"Section 5. * * * the average full day production
of all employes engaged in the same work for the
same employer * * * shall be taken as the daily wage,
* * * multiplying such sum by six shall be the weekly
wage."
Does this mean the average production for the day of the
accident of all men in the same employ? Or does it mean
the average over some period to be fixed by the Industrial
Commission.

DICTA

The result would be, in coal mining at least, to award
compensation in every case at the maximum rate, owing to the
irregularity of employment. The compensation suggested is
far in excess of the actual average earnings.
The bill discriminates against the steadily-working permanent employee in favor of the occasional worker, and in a
word, the bill is unduly burdensome to employers, and discriminates among classes of employees.

LINCOLN ON STEPHENS

Under date of February 2, 1848, from the House of Representatives, while serving as member of Congress, Lincoln
wrote this short note to Herndon, his law partner, at Springfield, Ill.:
"Dear William: I take up my pen to tell you that Mr.
Stephens, of Georgia, a little, slim, pale-faced, consumptive
man, with a voice like Logan's (Stephen T., not John A.), has
just concluded the very best speech, of an hour's length, I ever
heard. My old withered, dry eyes (he was not quite 39 years
old then) are full of tears yet."

NOTICE
DICTA wishes to advise all members of the Denver
Bar Association that the payment of their Association
membership fee entitles them to receive Dicta without
further charge. Some confusion has arisen on this
point, and several members of the Association have sent
in checks in payment for subscriptions.
DICTA appreciates the compliment and regrets that
it cannot devise some method of retaining such checks,
but feels compelled sadly to advise all such "repeaters"
that their remittances will "in due course" return home
again.

DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
IN CALIFORNIA
By Jacob J. Lieberman
(This is the Fifth article in the series being w'ritten especially for Dicta by Mr.
Lieberman of the Los Angeles Bar, formerly of the Denver Bar, bearing upon the similarities and differences betw.een Colorado and California law and procedure.)

W

HILE lawyers both in California and in Colorado re-

fer to the laws relating to the distribution of the property of intestate decedents, this law in California is
technically referred to as the Law of Succession.
Distribution of intestate estates in California is made in
the following order:
1. If decedent leaves a surviving husband or wife and
only one child or the lawful issue of one child, the estate goes
half to the surviving spouse and half to the surviving child,
or issue of such child.
2. If decedent leaves a surviving spouse and more than
one child living (or the lawful issue of such children, or
either or any thereof) the one-third of the Estate goes to the
surviving spouse, and the remainder in equal shares to the
children (or their issue).
3. If decedent leaves no surviving spouse but leaves issue, the whole estate goes to such issue.
4. If decedent leaves no issue, the estate goes half to the
surviving husband or wife, and the other half to the decedent's
father and mother in equal shares, and if either of said parents is dead, the whole of said half goes to the surviving
parent, and if there is no such parent, then such half goes in
equal shares to the brothers and sisters of decedent, and to
the children or grandchildren of any of deceased's brothers
or sisters. (How different this is from Colorado's law!)
5. If the decedent leaves no issue, nor husband nor wife,
the estate goes to decedent's father and mother in equal shares
or to the survivor of them.
6. If there is neither issue, husband, wife, father nor
mother, then in equal shares to the brothers and sisters of de-
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cedent (and to the children or grandchildren of any deceased
brother or sister).
7. Only in the event decedent dies leaving neither issue
nor parents nor brothers or sisters, nor the children or grandchildren of deceased's brothers or sisters, does the whole estate go to the surviving husband or wife.
8. In the event the relatives of all of the foregoing degrees are dead, the estate must go to the next of kin in equal
degree, excepting that when there are two or more collateral
kindred in equal degree, but claiming through different ancestors, then those who claim through the nearest ancestor
must be preferred.
9. Where there are no heirs as fixed by the Statute, the
estate, like elsewhere, escheats to the State, and in such event
such escheated estate goes into a fund for the support of the
common schools.
The foregoing succession, of course, relates only to property of the individual which belonged entirely to him or her
as his or her separate estate. It does not relate to community
property.
Community property is that property acquired by a married person within the State of California or brought to the
State of California by a married person, which would have
become community property in this State had it been acquired here during the married status, except the property
acquired through gift, devise, bequest or inheritance. The
theory behind the community property law, of course, is that
any earnings or profits derived or acquired by a married person during the married state accrues to the benefit of both
husband and wife because theoretically it is the result of the
joint efforts of the married couple.
Since 1923 community property, in the absence of a will,
goes by operation of law to the surviving spouse. This, therefore, constitutes the exception to the foregoing laws of succession. In other words, where community property is owned
by the parties, one undivided half is that of the husband, and
the other undivided half is that of the wife. Each has the
absolute right to dispose of this undivided half as well as any
other property which might, under the law, be separate prop-
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erty by will, but in case this undivided half of the community
property has not been disposed of by the will, it all goes to
the surviving spouse.
Where decedent is a widow or widower leaving no issue,
but his or her deceased spouse did have issue who are living
at the time of the death of such widow or widower, and there
is property in the Estate of such widow or widower which
was community property when he or she and his or her spouse
were living together, then such community property goes to
the heirs of the deceased spouse in the same manner and in
the same succession in which other property goes to such heirs.
Kindred of the half blood inherit equally with those of the
whole blood in the same degree, unless the inheritance came
to the intestate by descent, devise or gift of some one of his
ancestors in which case all those, who are not of the blood of
such ancestor, must be excluded from such inheritance.
Illegitimate children are, in all cases, heirs of their mother and where they have been legitimated by a subsequent marriage of their parents or adopted by the father by acknowledgment of parenthood, in writing signed in the presence of a
competent witness, then such illegitimate children are the lawful heirs of their father, the same as children legitimately
born, with certain exceptions.
Considerable complication arises at times because of the
fact that while community property may be disposed of by
will, the husband (where the wife is the testatrix and decedent) nevertheless has the power, pending administration,
to sell, manage and deal with the community's personal property, and for forty days after the death of the wife he has full
power to sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise deal with or dispose of the community real property, unless a notice is recorded in the County in which the property is situated to the
effect that an interest in the property is claimed by another
under the wife's will.
The one-half of the community property which belongs
to the surviving spouse is, by the way, specifically exempted
from inheritance tax.
By express provision of the Code no person who has been
convicted of the murder of the decedent is entitled to succeed
to any portion of decedent's estate.
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The Code refers to the succession by the children or issue
of deceased's children as being a succession by representation
and this is defined as taking place "when the descendants of
any deceased heir take the same share or right in the estate of
another person that their parents would have taken if living".
This term is held to be used in opposition to that of inheritance per capita.
There is no such restriction in California as there is in
Colorado as to the proportion of ones estate which the Testator must leave in his will to his surviving spouse, unless
waived.
Although the community property law, before referred
to, prevails in California, there is nothing to prevent the owning and holding of separate property if acquired by gift,
devise or inheritance, or if made separate property by the act
of the married persons themselves. In other words, a husband may, by deed, convey property to his wife as her sole
and separate property and vice versa, but neither spouse could
by his or her own act, without the consent of the other party,
make such separate property. On the other hand there is
nothing to prevent the acquisition and holding of property
in joint tenancy as distinguished from tenancy in common, or
community property. Joint tenancy in this State, like in
others, results in the passing of title to the surviving spouse
by operation of law upon the death of either party.
Title vests in the heirs immediately upon the death of the
intestate. This statement may be superfluous to a Colorado
lawyer, but it has actually required rulings of court here to
establish this principle of law in the State of California.
However, while title immediately on such death vests in the
heirs and not in the personal representative of the intestate,
the personal representative, of course, is entitled to the possession and control thereof for purposes of administration.

SUGGESTIONS FROM THE
CLERK'S OFFICE
F the Clerk's office of the District Court has in any degree
given prompt and efficient service, it is largely due to the
co-operation, good will and assistance contributed by members of the Bar, who are, almost exclusively, its patrons, and
we wish to take this opportunity of expressing our deep appreciation and thanks, and giving assurance that the spirit of
friendliness is mutual, and that we wish every lawyer would
feel that this office is his office and every employee a friend.
It is a pleasure to serve in any way we can and we are
happy to answer all questions. Occasionally, however, we
are met by one that stumps us. For example, a lady recently
came in very hurriedly and asked, "Is this the place where you
get divorces?" We told her that in a way it was but that she
would have to get an attorney. Whereupon she inquired,
"How much does one of them things cost, and would not a
lawyer do just as well?" We admit that this baffled our entire office force. Fortunately, major problems of the above
nature do not occur every day, else our prestige as a source
of information would be sadly in disrepair.
There are, however, certain difficulties and matters that
interfere with the exactness and efficiency with which this
office desires to serve the members of the Bar, and perhaps a
few comments along lines that would. help us to give better
service may not be amiss.
In an astonishing number of cases the office is hampered
in its work and the exactness of the records impaired due to
the attorneys' failure to exercise care enough as to minor details in the preparation of pleadings, decrees and the like.
For example, in many instances, papers are almost illegible
in some places, due to the use of a poor typewriter ribbon.
And very often papers are improperly bound when filed. In
addition, more careful attention to the following items would
facilitate our work and add to the exactness of the records:
the giving of the correct case number; the proper spelling
of the names of parties to the suit, and the proper giving of
initials, so that the names in the decree may appear as given
in the complaint (from which paper they are entered on the
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register of actions), unless altered during the pendency of the
suit by order of court. It is desirable also that where amounts
of money are stated, that they be set forth both in words and
in figures, and care should be taken that the figures and the
amounts given in words properly correspond. The statement
of the terms of court during which the decree is filed is very
often erroneously made, and the April and September terms
are not infrequently given as March, May, October or November.
Where blank forms are used, as in divorce decrees, care
should be taken to see that the words and sentences written
into the blank form, with pen or typewriter, are such that
when read in connection with the printed words of the form,
the sentences will be complete and the meaning clear; and
repetitions or- unnecessary parts of the printed form should
be stricken out in order to avoid confusion and very often
ambiguity.
These remarks are in no sense intended as a criticism, but
are made with the hope that, through more careful attention
by members of the Bar to some of the points noted, our office,
in turn, will be enabled to render them more effective and
exact service.
CORNELIUS WESTERVELT,

Chief Deputy Clerk, District Court.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EwTORS NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of the DicTA to print brief abstracts
of the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

APPEAL AND ERROR-APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT TO DisTRICT COURT.-No. 11,960.-Katz, vs. Cohen.-Decided

October 1, 1928.
Facts.-May 6, 1927, Katz had judgment against Cohen
in the County Court of Denver. The defendant, Cohen, was
granted time and given twenty days within which to elect to
appeal. On May 24, 1927, and within the period of twenty
days, the defendant appeared in the County Court and sustained the judgment and made an appeal to the District Court,
and on that day the County Court allowed the appeal on the
condition that he file an appeal bond to be approved within
ten days. The bond was filed and approved within this time.
It was contended that the Statute provides that appeals from
the County Court to the District Court must be made within
ten days after judgment unless the Court upon sufficient cause
shown extends the time for perfecting the appeal.
Held.-The County Court's granting twenty days within
which to elect to appeal was the equivalent of granting further
time within which to perfect the appeal, and the appeal was
made in time.
Judgment Affirmed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-DAMAGES-I NSTRUCTIONS.-No. 12,001.

Rollman vs. Stenger, as Receiver.-Decided October 29,
1928.
Facts.-Margaret Rollman was injured in a collision with
a street car operated by employees of Stenger, as Receiver.
Verdict and judgment was for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff failed
to incorporate in Abstract of Record the instructions given by
the Court.
Held.-Under the circumstances, the Court will not consider refusal to give requested instructions for so far as the
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abstract is concerned, the Court may have given an instruction stating the law substantially as requested. To entitle a
party to have this Court consider an assignment of error based
upon the refusal of the Trial Court to give a requested instruction, the abstract must set out the instructions that the
Court gave to the Jury. In any event the Court finds no actual
error in the Trial Court's refusal to give the requested instruction.
Judgment affirmed.
AUTOMOBILES--IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE.-No.

11,914.-Paul

Parker, Plaintiff in Error,vs. Anna Ullom, Defendant in
Error.-Decided October 28, 1928.
Facts.-One Ullom, husband of the Defendant in Error,
riding in an automobile driven by one Beckman, was killed in
a collision with an automobile driven by Parker. The evidence tended to show that Beckman and Ullom were acquainted, that at the time of the collision they were on their way to
participate in a gambling game. Beckman owned the car
which he was driving, and was not subject to Ullom's control.
Parker contends that Beckman's negligence should be imputed
to Ullom.
Holding.-In a case like this, negligence will not be imputed to a passenger unless he undertakes to or has the right
to exercise control over the movement of the vehicle.
Judgment affirmed.
COGNOVIT NOTES-PROHIBITION.-No. 12,104.-The Investors Finance Company vs. Luxford, as County Judge.-Decided October 29, 1928.
Facts.-The District Court sustained a demurrer to an
alternative Writ of Prohibition addressed to the County Court.
The Finance Company obtained a judgment in 1922 on a
cognovit note without service or notice on maker. Maker's
attorney was in correspondence with the Company at the time
and had set forth his client's claim of defense and was led by
them to believe that they acquiesced in these claims. Yet during this correspondence they took the judgment.
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Held.-That this amounts to fraud in procuring the judgment. Judgment debtor moved to set it aside and County
Court so ordered. Order was right. Motion was the proper
way to present the matter. County Court did not lose jurisdiction after one year to set it aside.
Judgment affirmed.
DEBTS.-No. 12,157.Searle vs. Town of Haxtun.-Decided October 22, 1928.
Facts.-Suitwas brought against the Town of Haxtun to
enjoin the issue of bonds for improvements to the town's electrict light plant. The town already owned an electric light
plant and voted the bonds for the purpose of making improvements. It was claimed that if the bonds constituted a debt
that they were in excess of the constitutional limit.
Held.-That since by the term of the bonds the bonds
were payable only out of the income from the plant and the
town itself was under no obligation to pay them, that such
bonds did not constitute a debt of the town within the constitutional meaning of debt.
Judgment affirmed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MUNICIPAL

DECREE-MODIFICATION.-No. 11,983. - Levand vs. North
America Realty Company.-Decided October 8, 1928.
Facts.-Decree was entered by lower Court against Levand, requiring specific performance of a contract for sale of
real estate. Levand prosecuted a Writ of Error to the Supreme Court and the Decree was affirmed in its entirety. One
of the things which the Decree required Levand to do was to
procure and deliver a policy of fire insurance on the improvements in the sum of eighteen hundred dollars. Levand claimed
he could not comply because the improvements-did not exceed two hundred fifty dollars in value, and was cited for
contempt.
Held.-Lower Court had power to modify a Decree as
to portion impossible for performance even after the Decree
had been affirmed in its entirety by the Supreme Court.
Decree so Modified.
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lia May Sands, as Administratrix, et al.-Decided October 8, 1928.
Facts.-Plaintiff's father signed, sealed and acknowledged a deed, which purported to convey certain land to plaintiff, but died without actually delivering it to her. Prior to
his death he stated that upon his death the deed should be delivered. Plaintiff sues the administratrix and heirs of the
grantor in said undelivered deed.
Held.-That there must be an actual delivery of a deed,
and that the facts in this case do not justify a holding that there
was a constructive delivery, as the deed was expressly not to
be delivered until after the death of the grantor. Delivery is
not merely a matter of intent alone, but some act by which the
grantor parts with control of the instrument must accompany
the intent. There is only oral evidence of a trust, and that is
insufficient under the Statute of Frauds.
Judgment affirmed.

DISPUTED BOUNDARIES.-No. 1 1,952.-Gameell vs. Strum-

pler.-Decided October 15, 1928.
Facts.-Action by Gamewell for injunction to restrain
Strumpler from entering upon Gamewell's lands. Answer
was general denial, coupled with demurrer for insufficient
facts. Judgment below for dismissal of the action.
Boundary lines between lands of plaintiff and defendant
had been changed by decree of the District Court in a former
action under Chapter Twenty-four of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Held.-Decree established boundary lines in the former
action and was sufficient under Code. The fact that lands
lying in township other than the township in which plaintiff's
and defendant's lands lie were included in the decree, did not
effect the decree between plaintiff and defendant. Service by
publication on defendant held to be sufficient.

.Judgment affirmed.
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DIVORCE-DIVISION OF PROPERTY.-No. 11,773.-Ikeler vs.
Ikeler.-Decided October 8, 1928.
Facts.-Mrs.Ikeler obtained verdict and findings of fact
and conclusions of law in a divorce case, and a decree dividing
the property was entered before the six months for entry of
final decree had elapsed.
Held.-Under Statute, alimony and counsel fees, pendente lite may be allowed before final decree of divorce, but
no decree for division of property can be entered until a final
decree of divorce is granted.
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded.
MANDAMUS-ELECTIONS.-No. 12,231.-Armstrong, Secretary of State, vs. Simonson.-Decided October 19, 1928.
Facts.-Simonson obtained an alternative Writ of Mandamus commanding the Secretary of State to accept for filing
a certificate nominating Simonson as candidate for office as
State Senator.
Simonson had been designated by the assembly of the Republican party for State Senator and had accepted the designation, but was defeated at the primary by Stephen. Stephen
had died between the date of the primary and the general election. The committee to fill vacancies thereupon had nominated Simonson to fill the vacancy created by the death of
Stephen.
Held. - Section Five, Chapter Ninety-eight, Session
Laws of 1927, which declares that "No person who has been
defeated as a candidate in primary shall be eligible as a candidate for the same office in the next ensuing general election",
does not prevent the second choice of his own party for the
nomination for a particular office from receiving the nomination where the first choice of the party was prevented through
death, or voluntary surrender of the nomination from being
a contender for the office.
One of the principal purposes of this statute was to prevent a person who had sought a party nomination and was
defeated at the party primary election from running as the
candidate of a rival party in opposition to the candidate of his
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own party, and/or to prevent such person from running independently by petition after being defeated in opposition to
the candidate of his own party.
Judgment Affirmed.
MANDAMUS -

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS. -

No. 12,087.-

City of Victor vs. Halstead.-DecidedOctober 8, 1928.
Facts.-Halstead obtained a peremptory Writ of Mandamus against the City of Victor, ordering the levy of a tax
to pay certain interest coupons on bonds of the city. Defense
was that the City was heavily in debt and that if the levy was
made, it would require a levy of eighty-three mills, forcing
property owners to abandon their property.
Held.-I. The granting or refusing to grant a Writ of
Mandamus is somewhat discretionary with the Court.
2. The Court below did not abuse this discretion. A
judgment should not be refused on the ground that a trial
Court has abused its discretion, unless the record clearly discloses a plain abuse of that discretion.
Judgment Affirmed.
NUISANCE.-No. 12,047.-Mongone vs. The People.-De-

cided October 29, 1928.
Facts.-Mongone was perpetually enjoined from conducting or maintaining a nuisance on certain property under
the Provisions of Chapter 136 of Session Laws of 1921.
Held.-Complaint stated a good cause of action in equity
for the abatement of a nuisance. Where the real estate was
described by lot and block number in the Complaint, but
the evidence showed that the building was located at the
southwest corner of two certain streets, the real estate was
sufficiently identified.
Judgment Affirmed.
PAYMENT.-No. 12,051.-McAloon vs. Erickson.-Decided

October 15, 1928.
Facts.-Erickson had judgment in Trial Court against
McAloon, et al, for failure to deliver a tax sale certificate.
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McAloon owned the tax certificate, deposited it with the
County Treasurer for proceedings to get a tax deed.
Erickson wanted to get an assignment of it and gave a
check drawn on Cheyenne State Bank which was deposited
in Akron Bank and sent to Cheyenne State Bank with instructions to remit a draft for it. The Cheyenne State Bank failed
before the check was paid.
Held.-McAloon should have demanded cash of Cheyenne State Bank and if he had, he would have received the
money before the bank failed. Bank was McAloon's agent
and when bank accepted draft instead of cash, it did so at its
own risk.
Judgment Affirmed.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-D ISMISSAL.-No. 12,190.-Sch u eler vs. O'Berdo.-Decided October 29, 1928.
Facts.-O'Berdowas plaintiff and on his motion the District Court dismissed his action and the counter claim of the
defendant. A notice of the motion to dismiss, and that the
motion would come up for hearing on March 3 was served
on February 28. On March 3, the hearing was continued to
March 12, when the dismissal was ordered.
Held.-That the plaintiff may dismiss his action at any
time before trial if no counter claim has been made. The
notice of dismissal was served before the counter claim was
filed. The order of dismissal related to the first step taken
in its procurement and is to be regarded as having been made
at that date.
Judgment Affirmed.
PLEADING-QUANTUM

MERUIT.-No.

12,161.-McDonald,

Plaintiff in Error, vs. Thibault, Defendant in Error.-Decided October 15, 1928.
Facts.-TrialCourt rendered judgment against McDonald. Complaint alleged that defendants were indebted to the
plaintiff on account of services rendered as broker in securing
a purchaser for hotel business.
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Complaint failed to allege either an agreed price or the
reasonable value of the services. General demurrer was overruled.
Held.-Complaint defective because of failure to allege
either an agreed price or the reasonable value of the services.
Judgment Reversed.
PLEADING - DEFAULT. - No. 12,189. - Sauve,
Trustee in Bankruptcy, vs. Hamilton.-Decided October
22, 1928.
Facts.-Hamilton filed suit for foreclosure of a mortgage
given to one of the defendants, the Western Securities Investment Company. The Western Securities Investment Company went into bankruptcy and Sauve was appointed Trustee
in Bankruptcy.
Sauve, the Trustee, failed to appear and default was entered. Sauve after being in default two months appeared,
during the trial of the action, and asked leave to intervene.
Court below denied his application.
Held.-The Court's ruling denying the application was
within its legal discretion. Moreover, evidence was introduced below and Sauve failed to file a motion for a new trial,
and the issue being one of fact and not of law, a motion for a
new trial was essential to secure a hearing on review in the
Supreme Court.
Judgment Affirmed.
PRACTICE -

TAXATION-APPEAL

FROM ASSESSMENT-PROCEDURE.-No.

11,939.-E. J. Longyear Company, a corporation, vs. County of Lake, Colorado.-DecidedOctober 8, 1928.
Facts.-On June 19, 1924, the assessor of Lake County
placed a valuation on certain property owned by the Longyear
Company, on the basis of which tax was levied and paid under
protest. Thereafter, the Company perfected an appeal to the
District Court of Lake County which was allowed by the assessor on December 15, 1924. Depositions were taken by the
Company, and in this the County participated. On March
29, 1926, the County moved to dismiss the appeal upon the
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ground that no complaint had been filed as required by statute.
Holding.-In the opinion in Sugar Company vs. Fellows,
74 Colo. 242, handed down December 3, 1923, the Court held
under Section 7292 C. L. 1921, that the filing of a complaint
in a case like this was not necessary. Thereafter, in the opinion in Phillipsvs. Commissioners, 78 Colo. 387, handed down
December 14, 1925, the Court held that Section 8703 C. L.
1921 required a complaint to be filed within ten days after
taking an appeal. In the present case the appeal was perfected under the earlier decision, and both parties appeared
to have acquiesced in its application. Therefore, the filing
of a complaint within ten days is not jurisdictional, but this
may be done any time before trial.
Judgment Reversed.

TAX SALES-RIGHT OF DEFUNCT CORPORATION TO REDEEM.-

No. 11,961.-Ruth vs. Devany, as County Treasurer. Decided October 22, 1928.
Facts.-Ruth sued Defendant as County Treasurer, et al,
to set aside a redemption from tax sale. A mining corporation had owned the real estate and had been declared defunct
by the Secretary of State and attempted to redeem the property
from tax sale through and by the surviving members of its last
Board of Directors.
Held.-Even though the corporation was declared defunct and inoperative, neither the payment of taxes nor the
payment of redemption money comes within the prohibition
of the statute, being Section 2317 of the Compiled Laws of
1921.
The last Board of Directors of the corporation had a right
to redeem the property from sale because such a redemption
would inure directly to the benefit of the corporation and indirectly to the benefit of the stockholders, and also indirectly
to the benefit of creditors, providing that the corporation
might later on secure enough money to be reinstated.
Judgment fflirmed.
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WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION.-No.

1 2,141.-Central Surety

and Insurance Corporation, et al, vs. The Industrial Commission of Colorado and Fugitt.-DecidedOctober 22,1928.
Facts.-The Industrial Commission awarded Compensation to Fugitt for hernia. Under the Statute in order for
an employee to be entitled to compensation for hernia he must
clearly prove, first, that its appearance was accompanied by
pain, and second, that it was immediately preceded by some
accidental strain suffered in the course of the employment.
Held.-The facts sufficiently meet the above requirements of the Statute.
Judgment Aflirmed.

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(BDiTORS NoTe-It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note any interesting decisions of the United States District Court, the Denver District Court, the County
Court, and occasionally the Justice Courts.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.-No. 788 5 .- Spencer Penrose, vs. United States-J. Foster Symes, Judge.
Facts.-Action to recover additional income tax illegally
assessed on 1918 return. Plaintiff in 1918 sold copper stock
which he contended he acquired in 1916 and on that basis resulting in a loss. The certificates delivered were acquired
prior to March 1, 1913, nevertheless, plaintiff insisted he intended to sell stock acquired in 1916. A gain resulted if the
stock sold in 1918 was acquired prior to March 1, 1913.
Held.-(1) Certificates of stock delivered do not identify the shares sold, the intention of plaintiff controls; (2) the
fair market value of stocks sold on New York Stock Exchange,
dealt in generally and freely, is determined by listed quotations; (3) proof that the grounds in the application for refund
filed before Commissioner are. the same as the grounds sued
upon, is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the court.
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DENVER DISTRICT COURT. - No. 101,740. -Blackmer
Blackmer.-Division 5.-Charles C. Sackmann, Judge.
Facts.-Action by husband for divorce. Wife applies for
temporary alimony, attorneys fees, and court costs. Hearing
on petition and allowance ordered for wife. Subsequently the
wife filed supplementary petition for temporary alimony, attorneys fees, etc. Trial court refused to hear evidence on supplementary petition. Upon this ruling by trial court, the wife
applies for Writ of Error to Supreme Court. (See Daniels vs.
Daniels, 9 Colo. 142.)
Pending writ of error, the plaintiff noticed defendant to
set case for trial upon the merits. Defendant contends the
pending writ of error should stay proceedings in lower court.
Held.-The stay, if any, does not issue from the Trial
Court, and in the absence of a stay from the Supreme Court,
the case will proceed to trial upon the merits.

DENVER JUSTICE COURT.-No. 49,198.-Brown-White, Inc.,
vs. Dawson Bros. Company.-Walter E. White, Judge.
Facts.-A non-resident plaintiff sues a resident. Plaintiff
posts a cost bond, upon which his attorney appears as surety.
Defendant moves to dismiss the action under C. L. 1921, Secs.
6047 and 6048, on the ground no bond has been posted.
Held.-In view of C. L. 1921, Sec. 6012, the bond is a
nullity and no bond. Action dismissed.

pod aLEGALSTENOG RAPHER?
Gall Main 6565

Business• lN.MKen's
Olearind
douse
lend Savings Building .Der;%"r6

